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SOCRATES: Surely you’re following, Theaetetus; it’s my 
impression at any rate that you’re not inexperienced in things of 
this sort. 
THEAETETUS: Yes indeed, by the gods, Socrates, I wonder 
exceedingly as to why (what) in the world these things are, and 
sometimes in looking at them I truly get dizzy. 
SOCRATES: The reason is, my dear, that, apparently, 
Theodorus’ guess about your nature is not a bad one, for this 
experience is very much a philosopher’s, that of wondering.  For 
nothing else is the beginning (principle) of philosophy than this, 
and, seemingly, whoever’s genealogy it was, that Iris was the 
offspring of Thaumas (Wonder), it’s not a bad one. — Plato, 
Theaetetus 
 
 
he safest general characterization of the European philosophical 
tradition,” Alfred North Whitehead once famously remarked, “is 
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”1  If there is some 
truth to Whitehead’s remark, if the remark cannot be wholly reduced to or 
dismissed as mere hyperbole, then one such “series of footnotes” surely stems 
from Plato’s views on wonder.  Indeed, the observation that philosophy is 
grounded in wonder or thaumazein  ()2 is a part of Plato’s 
philosophical legacy that has been adopted and appropriated by thinkers as 
                                                 
1 A .  N .   W h i t e h e a d ,  Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York, NY: 
Macmillan, 1929), 63. 
2 Plato, Theaetetus, 155c-d. Taken from Plato's Theaetetus: Part I of The Being of the Beautiful, 
trans. by Seth Benardete (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986). Theaetetus’ 
response to Socrates’ suggestion, as rendered by Levett, is also worth noting: “Oh yes, indeed, 
Socrates, I often wonder like mad what these things can mean; sometimes when I’m looking at 
them I begin to feel quite giddy.” Taken from The Theaetetus of Plato, ed. by Myles Burnyeat, trans. 
by M.J. Levett (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990). Levett translates the 
Greek word huperphuos, which means, amongst other things, “overgrown” or “enormous,” as 
“like mad,” thus emphasizing the strange and extraordinary throes in which the philosopher is 
often trapped. Although wonder gives birth to philosophy, the rational exercise par excellence, the 
pathos itself borders on madness.  On the connection between philosophy, wonder, and madness, 
see John Sallis, “. . . A Wonder That One Could Never Aspire To Surpass,” in The Path of Archaic 
Thinking, ed. Kenneth Maly (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).  I am both 
indebted to and influenced by Sallis’ incisive observations in this essay. 
“T 
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diverse as Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Arendt.3 More 
contemporary thinkers, such as Phillip Fisher, John Llewelyn, R.W. Hepburn, 
and Mary-Jane Rubenstein, have also sought a deeper understanding of Plato’s 
declaration that the passion or pathos () of wonder constitutes the arche 
(), the “beginning” and sustaining “principle,” of philosophy.4  It is in the 
Theaetetus, of course, where Socrates tells the dialogue’s young namesake that 
philosophy is born of and nourished by nothing other than thaumazein and, 
sensibly enough, most scholars and commentators who seek to understand 
Plato’s views on wonder begin with and primarily focus on this dialogue.  As 
rich and revealing as the Theaetetus is on the topic of wonder, other dialogues, 
e.g., the Phaedrus, Symposium, and Phaedo, also have much to offer in this regard.5 
One way of coming to terms with Platonic wonder is to examine what types of 
things in the dialogues elicit the pathos in the first place.  My primary goal in this 
paper is to examine what evokes the wonder of Socrates and his interlocutors 
in a number of these works, and I will pay particularly close attention to what 
Plato has to say about the wondrous nature of humanity itself.  I will show that 
Plato depicts Socrates and other characters found in the dialogues, such as the 
young Theaetetus, as not only wonderers of the first rank, but also true 
wonders in themselves. 
 
Worth Our Wonder 
 
SOCRATES: This, too, you’ll observe in dogs…and it’s a 
thing in the beast worthy of our wonder. — Plato, Republic 
 
                                                 
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b; G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. by J. Sibree 
(New York, NY: Dover, 1956), 234 [Here Hegel speaks of “Aristotle’s dictum that philosophy 
proceeds from wonder,” which, of course, Aristotle inherited from Plato]; Søren Kierkegaard, 
Stages on Life’s Way, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 347-348; Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy, trans.  
by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
135 and passim; Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics,” Social Research, 1 (Spring, 1990), 99 
and passim. 
4 Phillip Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); John Llewelyn, “On the saying that philosophy begins in 
thaumazein,” in Post-Structuralist Classics, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1988); 
R.W.  Hepburn, “Wonder,” in Wonder and Other Essays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1984); Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
5 A word should be said here concerning the chronology of Plato’s dialogues.  The 
exact chronology of Plato’s dialogues is exceedingly difficult to establish and is the source of 
considerable disagreement among scholars.  For those wishing to explore the matter in great 
detail, Leonard Brandwood’s The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) offers a thorough and compelling overview of this fascinating and highly 
contentious subject.  As my primary line of argumentation does not require identifying the time 
period to which any of the dialogues examined in this work belong, i.e., the so-called ‘early’, 
‘middle’, and ‘late’ periods of Plato’s career and, given the complex and controversial nature of 
definitively establishing such a chronology, I have chosen not to take up this issue in my 
exploration of Platonic wonder.  
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What types of considerations or things induce wonder in the 
characters, the dramatis personae, found in Plato’s dialogues? The source of 
astonishment for Theaetetus in the epigraph that opens this paper is a 
numerical puzzle, forwarded by Socrates, which reveals that the youth’s beliefs 
concerning the process of becoming and number contradict one another.6 A 
second example occurs during Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, where the 
philosopher recounts the instruction he received from Diotima of Mantinea 
concerning the true nature of Eros.  According to Diotima, after the true lover 
beholds “successively and correctly the beautiful things,” starting from the love 
of a beautiful body and ascending through beautiful souls, institutions and 
laws, the sciences, and ending with a “certain single philosophical science,” he 
will be rewarded with a vision of that which is ti thaumaston ten phusin kalon, 
“something wonderfully beautiful in nature,” i.e., the Form of beauty itself.7 
Or, as a final example of what evokes wonder in the dialogues, let us recall 
Glaucon’s presentation of the myth of Gyges in the second book of the 
Republic.  Here Glaucon weaves a tale wherein a certain Lydian shepherd, who 
Glaucon identifies as an ancestor of Gyges, was tending his flock when a 
tremendous thunderstorm and earthquake suddenly broke out.  Afterwards, the 
shepherd noticed that the ground had split open and a chasm had formed at 
the very spot where his sheep normally grazed.  We are told that the shepherd 
“saw it, wondered [thaumasanta] at it, and went down.  He saw, along with other 
quite wonderful [thaumasta] things about which they tell tales, a hollow bronze 
horse.  It had windows; peeping in, he saw there was a corpse inside that 
looked larger than human size.”8  
Theaetetus’ wonder is sparked by a mathematical puzzle and the 
ontological complications that it implies; Diotima speaks of a wondrous beauty 
that is eternal, unchanging, singular, and self-sufficient; and Gyges’ ancestor is 
wonder-struck by a very large corpse entombed in a metal horse.  While 
puzzles, Forms, and seemingly superhuman bodies are all understandable 
objects of wonder, one is tempted to ask about the possibility of a different 
source of wonder in Plato’s works, a wonder evoked by the nature of the 
wondering beings themselves.  Wonder of this sort is found in Homer’s epic 
poetry.  For example, consider Achilles (Achilleus) and Priam’s wonder at one 
another’s appearance and disposition at the end of the Iliad: 
 
But when they had put aside their desire for eating and 
drinking, Priam, son of Dardanos, gazed upon Achilleus, 
wondering [thaumaz’] at his size and beauty, for he seemed 
like an outright vision of gods.  Achilleus in turn gazed on 
                                                 
6 Plato, Theaetetus, 154b-155c. See also Benardete, “Theaetetus Commentary,” I.106-
107 in the translation of the dialogue cited above.   
7 Plato, Symposium, 210a-211a. Gloss added. Taken from Plato’s Symposium, trans. by 
Seth Benardete (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
8 Plato, Republic, 359d. Gloss added. Taken from The Republic of Plato, trans. by Allan 
Bloom, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991).    
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Dardanian Priam and wondered [thaumazen], as he saw his 
brave looks and listened to him talking.9 
 
In their own respective ways, Athens’ great tragedians, such as Sophocles, deal 
with the wonder of human existence as well.10 What, then, can be said about 
the philosophical dialogues composed by the son of Ariston? Is the human 
person a wonder or thauma and therefore “worthy of our wonder”11 in these 
works? Are the individuals who sometimes find themselves caught up in 
wonder in the dialogues also presented as wonders or thaumata as well? In order 
to address these questions, we must return to the dialogues themselves.  The 
opening scene of one of Plato’s most beloved dialogues, the Phaedrus, will serve 
as our point of departure. 
 
Wonder, Monsters, And Human Beings: Phaedrus 
 
Know thyself  — Oracle at Delphi 
 
“Phaedrus, my friend! Where have you been? And where are you 
going?”12 At the beginning of the Phaedrus, Socrates meets the dialogue’s 
namesake as the latter is about to go beyond the city walls for a stroll in the 
country.  It seems that Phaedrus has spent the morning listening to a speech on 
love recently composed by his good friend Lysias.  Socrates surmises that 
Phaedrus was regaled with several readings of the speech and now wishes to 
commit the piece to memory by speaking it out loud beyond earshot of his 
fellow Athenians.  Socrates confesses to his friend that he is a “man who is sick 
with passion for hearing speeches,” and he insists that Phaedrus’ reluctance to 
recite the speech for him now is nothing but a playful ruse; the youth should 
stop playing “coy” and present the speech that has obviously occupied him for 
the entire morning.13 Phaedrus agrees to share Lysias’ speech with Socrates, 
and with this agreement the two Athenians head off into the surrounding 
countryside toward a “very tall plane tree” that Phaedrus knows of, a tree that 
casts ample shade and is visited by light breezes.14  
                                                 
9 Homer, Iliad, 24.628-632. Gloss added. Taken from The Iliad of Homer, trans. by 
Richard Lattimore (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1961).     
10 See the section below on Sophocles’ Antigone and the Ode to Man. 
11 Plato, Republic, 327a. 
12 Plato, Phaedrus, 227a. Taken from Phaedrus, trans. by Alexander Nehamas & Paul 
Woodruff (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995).   
13 Ibid., 228a-228c.   A number of commentators have noted that Socrates’ claim that 
he is “sick with passion for hearing speeches” and a “lover of speeches” is rather odd and more 
than likely ironic, as Socrates is normally portrayed in the dialogues as preferring elenctic 
exchange to forays into highfalutin rhetoric.  See Nehamas & Woodruff, “Introduction,” xiv-xv, 
in the translation of the Phaedrus cited above; James A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as 
Drama (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991), 186; Charles L.  Griswold Jr., Self-
Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 28-29. 
14 Plato, Phaedrus, 229a-b.  
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As they walk alongside the stream Ilisus, Phaedrus points out to 
Socrates the place where Boreas, the god of the north wind, reportedly 
kidnapped princess Oreithuia, and he asks Socrates if he holds the story to be 
true.  If he held the story to be false, Socrates responds with thinly veiled irony, 
he would certainly find a place among many of the prevailing “intellectuals” or 
sophoi who concern themselves with such matters: 
 
Actually, it would not be out of place for me to reject it, 
as our intellectuals do.  I could then tell a clever story: I 
could claim that a gust of the North Wind blew her over 
the rocks where she was playing with Pharmaceia; and 
once she was killed that way people said she had been 
carried off by Boreas—or was it, perhaps, from the 
Areopagus? The story is also told that she was carried 
away from there instead.15 
 
For the sophoi, only a physical or natural explanation of the Oreithuia story is 
capable of revealing its truth.  It was the wind as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, and not the mythical personification of the wind, Boreas, that 
caused Oreithuia to fall to her death.  The task of demythologizing the 
traditional stories in such a manner, according to Socrates, is not an enviable 
one, as the intellectual who provides one such account may very well feel 
compelled to go on and offer similar accounts of Gorgons, Hippocentaurs, 
Chimaera, Pegasuses and other creatures that are marvelous and strange.16 
Indeed, accounting for all the creatures and events of lore in this way would 
surely “overwhelm” even the most ambitious individual.17 While Socrates 
obviously has some reservations about explaining the traditional myths in these 
terms, it is important to note that he does not  claim that the intellectuals’ 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 229c-d.   
16 Ibid., 229d-e.  Socrates holds these mythical creatures to be teratologon and atopiai in 
nature. The word teratologon stems from the word teratologos, and the latter according to Liddell-
Scott means something “of which marvelous things are told” and/or “portentous.” The word 
atopiai stems from the word atopia, which literally means “a being out of the way” and can be 
rendered as “strangeness” or “oddness.” An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: Founded Upon the 
Seventh Edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), s.v. 
“” and “.” The Fowler translation of this passage emphasizes the 
strangeness of these mythical creatures: “But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very pretty 
in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable man, 
for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then 
that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd of such creatures, Gorgons 
and Pegas, and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous natures.” Taken from Plato in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9, trans. by H.N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).   
17 Plato, Phaedrus, 229e.  For a thorough treatment of Socrates’ aversion to reductive 
explanations of the traditional myths, see Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, 36-39. See 
also G.R.F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato’s Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 9-12; Graeme Nicholson, Plato’s Phaedrus: The Philosophy of Love (West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999), 15-24.  
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accounts are  necessarily wrong.18 Thus, Socrates’ reservations about 
interpreting the traditional myths à la the sophoi may have more to do with a 
belief that accounting for all fabled creatures and events in this manner would 
constitute a labor beyond Herculean than a conviction concerning the 
epistemic worth of such accounts as such.  Still, even if Socrates believes that 
physical accounts of the traditional myths do hold some epistemic promise, it 
is clear that he is neither opposed to nor aligned against myth qua myth in the 
Phaedrus.  Indeed, we shall soon see that Socrates adverts to and makes use of a 
mythical creature for his own philosophical purposes in this dialogue.  The fact 
of the matter is that Socrates simply does not have time to spare for studying 
or formulating any more natural accounts of legendary creatures or events.  
What, then, does Socrates have time to investigate? What does lay claim to his 
attention, grip him, or provoke his wonder? 
The reason why Socrates has no time to explain the traditional myths 
in physical or natural terms is that he has yet to fully plumb the depths of his 
own soul.19 Socrates holds that he must first come to terms with his own 
nature before he can sensibly turn his attention to other matters:  
 
But I have no time for such things; and the reason, my 
friend, is this.  I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription 
orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me 
ridiculous to look into other things before I have 
understood that.  This is why I do not concern myself 
with them.  I accept what is generally believed, and, as I 
was just saying, I look not into them but into my own 
self: Am I a beast more complicated and savage than 
Typho, or am I a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a 
divine and gentle nature?20 
 
As we know from the Phaedo, there was a time when naturalistic accounts of 
the vast and variegated phenomena of the world fascinated Socrates, a time 
when as a young man he was “wondrously desirous [thaumastos hos epethumesa] of 
that wisdom they call ‘inquiry into nature’.”21 The Socrates we meet in the 
Phaedrus, however, now finds that there is more than enough wonder that 
envelops the human person in general, and his own soul in particular, to 
occupy his time.  He is a mystery to himself, and no less a god than Apollo 
commands him to study his own soul before turning his attention to other 
                                                 
18 Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, 37. 
19 Plato, Phaedrus, 229d-230e. 
20 Ibid., 229e-230a.   
21 Plato, Phaedo, 96a. Gloss added. Plato’s Phaedo, trans. by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, 
and Eric Salem (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing/R Pullins Company, 1998). Concerning 
Socrates’ interest in nature, the translators offer the following note: “In Aristophanes’ Clouds, 
Socrates is lampooned for his acquaintance with the opinions of the so-called “physicists,” who 
speculated on the constitution of the visible world (225 ff.).” Nicholson also draws a connection 
between the Phaedrus and the Phaedo on this issue.  See Nicholson, Plato’s Phaedrus: The Philosophy 
of Love, 21.  
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matters such as devising physical accounts of the traditional myths.  He is a 
wonder to himself, a wonder that rivals if not surpasses the marvelous nature 
of any and all mythical monsters.  As Benjamin Jowett puts it: “‘the proper 
study of mankind is man,’ who is a far more complex and wonderful being 
than the serpent Typhon.”22  
 
Hesiod and Typho 
 
From his shoulders grew a hundred heads of a snake, a fearful 
dragon, with dark, flickering tongues, and from under the brows of 
his eyes in his marvellous heads flashed fire, and fire burned from 
his heads as he glared. — Hesiod, Theogony 
 
Of all the creatures found in stories and legends, why does Socrates 
mention Typho as he discusses his ongoing quest for self-knowledge with 
Phaedrus? According to Hesiod, Typho (Typhon, Typhoeus) is the child of 
Earth and Tartarus and was born shortly after Zeus had cast the Titans out of 
Heaven.23 The poet describes Typho as a “fearful dragon," a deinoio drakontos, 
who possesses terrible strength, multiple serpentine heads, and a scorching 
gaze.24 The monster’s “marvellous” heads would emit uncanny voices and 
sounds, roars, bellows, and whelps, all of which were thaumat’  akousai or 
“wonderful to hear.”25 Quickly perceiving that Typho had designs on ruling 
humanity and the immortals alike, Zeus engaged the creature in a vicious battle 
and eventually proved victorious, casting the “maimed wreck” that was once 
proud Typho into “wide Tartarus.”26 Even in this diminished state, Typho still 
continues to issue “boisterous winds” that destroy ships and sailors alike.27 
According to Hesiod, the only winds that are a “great blessing to men” are 
Boreas, Notus, and Zephyr, as they alone are winds of the “god-sent kind.”28 
Who or what, then, is Socrates? Is the philosopher a “god-sent” human being 
                                                 
22 Benjamin Jowett, “Introduction to the Phaedrus,” 361, as found in The Works of Plato, 
trans. by B. Jowett (New York, NY: The Dial Press, 1936).  See also Paul Friedländer, Plato: The 
Dialogues, Second and Third Periods, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), 220: “Yet, all along, it ultimately is the same Socrates we meet.  He wants to “know 
himself,” for he is a riddle to himself (229e et. seq.), and his “strangeness” () is as 
astonishing here (229c 6, 230c 6) to Phaidros as it is to Alkibiades in the Alkibiades Major (106a) 
and in the Symposium (215a).” Nehamas and Woordruff (“Introduction,” ix-x) compare and 
contrast the monsters faced by Socrates and Odysseus, respectively: “Odysseus met external 
enemies: strange gods, weird monsters, unknown peoples.  Socrates, who claims that, not 
“knowing himself,” he wonders whether he is “a beast more complicated and savage than 
Typho, or. . . a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature,” discovers by the 
banks of the river Ilisus parts of himself he had never known before.  The “monsters” he meets, 
though not malevolent, come from within.” 
23 Hesiod, Theogony, 820-823. Taken from Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, 
trans. by Hugh G.  Evelyn-White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914). 
24 Ibid., 825-829. 
25 Ibid., 829-834. 
26 Ibid., 836-868. 
27 Ibid., 868-876. 
28 Ibid., 870-871.  
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who is capable of benefiting those he encounters, like his friend Phaedrus, or is 
he rather a sender of ruinous winds? 
 
Deinos and the Ode to Man 
 
The repetition of the key words, deina. . . deinoteron, forms a strong 
emphasis and opens a range of possible meanings: fearsome and 
marvelous, potent and strange, mighty and resourceful, wonderful but 
also terrifying. — Robert F.  Goheen, The Imagery of 
Sophocles’ Antigone 
 
In speaking of winds, waters, and a man who might be deinoio  or 
“fearful” in nature, one is reminded of the first lines of the famous Ode to 
Man as found in Sophocles’ Antigone: 
 
polla ta deina kouden anthropou deinoteron pelei. 
touto kai poliou peran pontou cheimerioi notoi 
chorei, peribruchioisin 
peron hup’oidmasin. 
 
Many are the wonders, none 
is more wonderful than what is man. 
This it is that crosses the sea 
with the south winds storming and the waves swelling, 
breaking around him in roaring surf.29 
 
The words deina and deinoteron, which David Grene translates as “wonders” and 
“wonderful” in this passage, as well as deinoio, the word which Hesiod uses to 
describe Typho, all stem from deinos,  a polyvalent word which can mean, 
amongst other things, that which brings about a sense of wonder, but it can 
also mean that which is strange or uncanny, terrible, fearful, or dreadful.30 As 
Martha Nussbaum observes, the word can indicate that which evokes an 
affirming wonder with respect to a human being and that which is uncanny or 
                                                 
29 Sophocles, Antigone, 368-372. Greek Tragedies, ed. by David Grene and Richard 
Lattimore, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).  David Grene is 
the translator of Antigone in this volume. Cited lines will follow Grene’s line numbers for the 
translated text in this volume. 
30 George Steiner’s observation concerning the sheer volume and diversity of 
interpretations of the choral ode in general (and specifically the word deinon) is apposite here: 
“To list the literature which has accumulated around the second stasimon in Antigone would be to 
establish a bibliography of studies in Sophocles.” George Steiner, Antigones (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 174.  For example, see Robert F.  Goheen, The Imagery of Sophocles’ Antigone: A Study 
of Poetic Language and Structure (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 53-54; Martha 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 52-
53.  
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even monstrous in humanity.31 In this vein, Nussbaum goes on to note that the 
chorus refers to “man” by using the neuter pronoun in line 335 (“This it is that 
crosses the sea. . . ”), thereby lending further emphasis to humanity’s 
strangeness.32  What, then, is a human being? A monster, perhaps? A rational 
being? Both? Socrates, too, is perplexed about his nature: Is he monstrous like 
Typho, the creature with a hundred heads, or is he a “tamer, simpler animal,” 
blessed by the divine with reason, speech, and civility? When we reflect on 
these considerations with care and honesty, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
remain indifferent to the principle that grounds Socrates’ self-inquiry and 
explains his reluctance to interpret the traditional myths in the manner of the 
prevailing intellectuals.  This principle can be stated in the form of a question: 
Why should we seek out natural explanations of the strange beings and 
creatures of lore when we still are a mystery to ourselves?  
Perhaps Phaedrus himself puts it best.  Upon reaching the plane tree, 
Socrates suddenly becomes enchanted with the immediate surroundings. In a 
manner befitting an inspired poet, the philosopher proceeds to sing the praises 
of the river’s cool water and the “sweet song of the cicadas’ chorus” that fills 
the air.33 Phaedrus is quite surprised by Socrates’ enthusiasm: “But you, you 
amazing man, appear to be very much out of place!”34 Phaedrus’ word choice is 
exceedingly significant: Socrates is “amazing” (thaumasie) and “very much out 
of place” (atopotatos).  Ian Leask observes that atopotatos is the superlative form 
of atopos, a word whose meanings include ‘out of place’, ‘out of the way’, and 
‘strange’.35 Phaedrus holds Socrates to be amazing precisely because it is quite 
strange or out of place for this philosopher, who spends the vast majority of 
his time philosophizing within the confines of the city, to be waxing poetic 
about the splendors of nature by a river in the countryside.36 In this sense, 
                                                 
31 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 52-53: “The human being, who appears to be 
thrilling and wonderful, may turn out at the same time to be monstrous in its ambition to 
simplify and control the world.” 
32 Ibid., 73: “ ‘This thing,’ they say, using the neuter pronoun, distancing themselves 
from the strangeness of this creature, attempting to give a dispassionate story of its nature and its 
behavior, ‘crossing the gray sea. . . .’” 
33 Plato, Phaedrus, 230b-c. 
34 Plato, Phaedrus, 230c. Taken from Phaedrus, trans. by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). Compare Nichols’ rendering of this key line from the 
Phaedrus with Nehamas and Woodruff’s rendering: “And you, my remarkable friend, appear to be 
totally out of place.” It seems to me that by translating thaumasie  as “amazing” instead of 
“remarkable,” Nichols better captures Socrates’ wondrousness than Nehamas and Woodruff do 
in their otherwise fine translation. This is the only instance in which I draw upon Nichols’ 
translation of the Phaedrus.   
35 With respect to the various connotations of the word atopos, Leask cites Liddell and 
Scott’s Greek-English Dictionary.  See Ian Leask, “Strangely out of Place: Phaedrus 227a-230e,” 206 
in  Between System and Poetics: William Desmond And Philosophy After Dialectics, ed. by T. Kelly 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007).  See also note 16 above. 
36 Plato, Phaedrus, 230c-d.  At this point in dialogue, Phaedrus observes the following 
to Socrates: “Not only do you never travel abroad—as far as I can tell, you never even set foot 
beyond the city walls.” Socrates responds by noting that the people in the city are better teachers 
than the scenery and flora one finds in the country: “Forgive me, my friend.  I am devoted to  
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Phaedrus’ surprise and exclamatory remark are understandable. At a deeper 
level, however, Phaedrus’ remark comes remarkably close to expressing what 
Socrates told him moments before, namely that the philosopher has yet to 
achieve what the Delphic inscription commands.  Socrates does not yet know 
himself.  He is not entirely sure what he is or where he belongs.  Hasn’t 
Socrates, the rational inquirer par excellence, already admitted that he may have 
more in common with a monster like Typho than he currently realizes? Might 
he not be more strange or marvelous than the mythical creatures that the 
intellectuals seek to understand in naturalistic terms? Perhaps more than he is 
capable of understanding, Phaedrus has provided Socrates with the most 
appropriate sobriquet imaginable: “amazing man.” Within or without the city 
walls, Socrates is, and will likely remain, as amazing and strange to himself as 
he is to others.  Like the Chorus in Antigone, Socrates finds that there is more 
than enough wonder evoked by human nature in general, and his own nature in 
particular, to last a lifetime. 
There are other moments in the Platonic dialogues when the 
wondrous nature of the human person comes to light.  Alcibiades, in his 
drunken encomium to Socrates at the end of the Symposium, provides us with a 
second and especially illuminating example of this type of wonder, and it is to 
this memorable speech that we will now turn. 
 
A Wonder and a Wonderer: Symposium 
 
ALCIBIADES: Now, one could praise Socrates for many other 
amazing things; but whereas for the rest of his pursuits—one might 
perhaps say the like about someone else as well—what deserves all 
wonder is that respect in which he is like no human being, neither 
the ancients nor those of the present day.  — Plato, Symposium 
 
The Symposium presents a series of eulogies in honor of Eros given by 
Socrates, the comic poet Aristophanes, and others at a party hosted by the 
tragic playwright Agathon. Immediately after Socrates’ eulogy of Eros, a 
commotion erupts in Agathon’s courtyard.  An intoxicated Alcibiades, with a 
flute girl and fellow revelers in tow, has come to congratulate Agathon on his 
first victory as a tragedian.  Drunk with wine and wearing fillets in his hair, 
Alcibiades bears an unmistakable resemblance to the god Dionysus.  As 
Alcibiades sits down next to Agathon, seeking to weave a wreath from his 
fillets in order to crown the victorious playwright, he suddenly realizes that he 
does not share the couch with Agathon alone; much to Alcibiades’ surprise and 
apparent consternation, a third party, one who has long tormented him, is 
reclining on the couch as well: 
 
Heracles! What is the meaning of this? Socrates is here? 
Once again you lie in ambush; and just as is your habit, 
                                                                                                                  
learning; landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only the people in the city can do 
that.”  
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you appear suddenly wherever I believed you were least 
likely to be.  And now, why have you come? And why did 
you lie down here? For it is not with Aristophanes, or 
with anyone else who is—or wants to be—laughable that 
you lie; but you managed it so that you lie down beside 
the most beautiful of those in the room.37 
 
Socrates responds to Alcibiades’ not-so-gentle reproach by asking for 
Agathon’s assistance, confiding to the tragedian that his love of Alcibiades has 
brought him a horde of problems. Indeed, Alcibiades now becomes fiercely 
jealous whenever Socrates converses with or even glances at another beautiful 
human being, and in such a state Athens’ darling has done some mad and 
“amazing [thaumasta] things” to him.38 Yet, as Alcibiades will soon reveal, it is 
Socrates whose words and deeds are truly amazing.   
Although Alcibiades insists that he cannot be reconciled to Socrates, 
he still feels compelled to crown his tormenter in addition to wreathing 
Agathon, for while the playwright does have one impressive victory to his 
credit, Socrates’ conquests are simply vast in number: “[Agathon] . . . spare us 
some of the fillets, so that I may wreathe this amazing head [thaumasten 
kephalen] of his; and he need not reproach me because I wreathed you, and not 
him; for he conquers all human beings in speeches, and not just the day before 
yesterday as you did, but at all times.”39 Like the other guests, Alcibiades will 
earn his drink by providing a eulogy, but unlike the others he will not sing the 
praises of Eros.  Instead, Alcibiades will praise the one person who has proven 
to be somewhat impervious to his striking beauty and charm. And so 
Alcibiades begins his eulogy of Socrates.    
Alcibiades must rely upon “likenesses” in his praise of Socrates.40 He 
begins by comparing Socrates to the little statues found in the sculptors’ shops 
whose outlandish exteriors belie their beautiful interiors. Erasmus describes 
these statues, called sileni, in the following way: “It seems the Sileni were 
statuettes divided in half and put together so that they could be opened up and 
the interior displayed. When closed they portrayed some ridiculous and 
monstrous flute player, but when opened all of a sudden they displayed a 
god.”41 Alcibiades also compares Socrates with the satyr Marsyas. Like the 
famous satyr, Socrates is able to enchant those who listen to him despite his 
rather ugly appearance. Yet Alcibiades holds Socrates to be “far more 
marvelous [thaumasioteros] to be sure, than Marsyas,” as the satyr uses a flute to 
transfix his listeners, while Socrates can “charm” his listeners through the 
                                                 
37 Plato, Symposium, 213b-c. 
38 Ibid., 213c-d.  Gloss added. 
39 Ibid., 213d-e.  Gloss added. 
40 Ibid., 215a. 
41 Erasmus, “The Sileni of Alcibiades,” 169.  Taken from Utopia, With Erasmus’s The 
Sileni of Alcibiades, ed. and trans. by David Wootton (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999).    
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power of his words alone.42 Included in the ranks of those who have 
experienced the force and sway of Socrates’ words is Alcibiades himself.   
Normally reveling in the honors and glories bestowed upon him by his fellow 
Athenians, Alcibiades confesses that Socrates alone can make him feel ashamed 
of playing to the wishes of the crowd instead of caring for his own soul.43 But 
this account only scratches the surface of this enigmatic man, and much more 
must be said about Socrates and “how amazing [thaumasian] is the power he 
has.”44  
According to his eulogist, Socrates is truly silenic, for he wraps himself 
in the guise of a man who is erotically “thunderstruck” by youthful beauty.45 
However, if one delves beneath this guise, one discovers that Socrates, 
although not entirely immune to the charms of physical beauty, is far more 
taken with beautiful souls than he is with beautiful bodies.46 It turns out that 
the physically beautiful Alcibiades has also been enthralled by a beautiful soul 
in the past, namely the soul of the man that he is currently eulogizing.  There 
once was a moment when Socrates briefly dropped his customary veil of irony 
and truly unfolded himself to Alcibiades, and the latter found that within this 
silenic human being dwelled “images” of wondrous beauty: 
 
And when he is in earnest and opened up, I do not know 
if anyone has seen the images within; but I once saw 
them, and it was my opinion that they were so divine, 
golden, altogether beautiful, and amazing [thaumasta] that 
one had to do just about whatever Socrates 
commanded.47 
 
Continuing his eulogy, Alcibiades admits that he once tried to seduce Socrates 
and failed spectacularly.  Such a failure was undoubtedly rare for Alcibiades, 
and only an exceedingly rare individual could be responsible for it.  Indeed, 
only a “daemonic [daimonioi] and amazing [thaumastoi] being” like Socrates could 
rebuff the advances of the handsome and charming Alcibiades, and only such a 
man, despite this “magnificently overweening deed,” could still be loved and 
admired for his “nature, moderation, and courage” by the “dishonored” 
Alcibiades.48  
The next stage of Alcibiades’ speech deals with Socrates’ deeds during 
two different military campaigns.  While campaigning at Potidaea, Socrates 
displayed far better “self-control” than his fellow soldiers when the enemy 
temporarily cut off their food supplies.49 The philosopher’s self-control, 
                                                 
42 Plato, Symposium, 215b-d.  Gloss added.  
43 Ibid., 215d-216b.   
44 Ibid., 216c.  Gloss added. 
45 Ibid., 216d. 
46 Ibid., 216d-e. 
47 Ibid., 216e-217a.  Gloss added. 
48 Ibid., 219c-d.  Gloss added. 
49 Ibid., 219e-220a.  
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according to Alcibiades, was no less impressive when it came to passing the 
cup: 
 
And again at festivities he alone was able to take pleasure 
in other things, and in drinking as well; for even though 
he wasn’t willing to drink, whenever he was compelled to 
do so, he outdid everybody; and what is the most amazing 
[thaumastotaton] thing of all, no human being has ever seen 
Socrates drunk.50 
 
Unrivaled in terms of controlling his hunger and handling his drink, no one 
could match Socrates’ indifference to the brutal cold of winter as well: “. . . in 
regard to resistance against the winter—for winters are terrible there—all the 
rest he did was amazing [thaumasia].”51 In the midst of a frost so horrific that 
those who dared to go outside did so wrapped “in an amazing [thaumasta] 
number of garments,” Socrates went barefoot and still made better time than 
his “shod” companions.52  
While enduring the pangs of hunger, the dizzying effects of spirited 
drink, and the brutal cold with patience and equanimity are all noteworthy 
deeds, they nevertheless pale in comparison to the twenty-four hour bout of 
astonishment that Socrates endured on this campaign: 
 
‘What sort of thing the strong man did and dared’53there 
on campaign once, is worth hearing.  Once, he had gotten 
a thought, and he stood on the same spot from dawn on, 
considering it; and when he made no progress, he did not 
let up but stood searching.  And it was already noon, and 
the men became aware of it; and in amazement one said 
to another that Socrates had stood there in reflection 
since dawn.  And finally some Ionians, when it was 
evening and they had dined—for it was then summer—
brought out their pallets and slept in the cold and 
watched to see if he would also stand during the night.  
And he stood until it was dawn and the sun came up; and 
then having made a prayer to the sun he went away.54 
 
Alcibiades will go on to recall how Socrates saved his life and weapons on this 
campaign, and he will also recount a second campaign at Delium where 
Socrates, in the midst of a collective retreat after been routed by the enemy, 
proceeded with an almost uncanny calm, “‘stalking like a pelican, his eyes 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 220a.  Gloss added. 
51 Ibid., 220a.  Gloss added. 
52 Ibid., 220a-b.  Gloss added. 
53 “Homer, Odyssey, 4.242, 271.” Translator’s footnote. 
54 Plato, Symposium, 220c-d.    
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darting from side to side,’”55 making it plain to all and sundry that he was a 
capable man who should simply be left alone.56 For many of us, however, it is 
the image of Socrates standing stock still for an entire day in camp, caught up 
and transfixed by such an intense wonder as to evoke “amazement” 
(thaumazontes) in his fellow soldiers, that endures most vividly.  Others have 
proved their courage in the field of battle, but has there ever been another 
human being who could match Socrates’ philosophical vigilance, standing 
watch over a wonder so unrelenting as to see the light of a moon and two 
dawns? The wondering Ionian soldiers—who, hailing from the same land as 
Thales, come from good stock when it comes to wonder—is supplemented by 
food, blankets, and intermittent sleep.  The wily Odysseus stood enrapt at the 
song of the Sirens, but he was strapped fast to a mast of unyielding wood.57 
The grip of Socrates’ wonder, however, is as sure and steadfast as Odysseus’ 
bonds.  Astonishingly, the hunger, cold, and exhaustion that would surely 
diminish if not destroy the thaumazein of most other human beings can simply 
gain no purchase on Socrates’ soul as he stands transfixed among the marveling 
Ionians.  
Alcibiades ends his eulogy of Socrates by remarking upon the latter’s 
singular nature: 
 
Now, one could praise Socrates for many other amazing 
[thaumasia] things; but whereas for the rest of his 
pursuits—one might perhaps say the like about someone 
else as well—what deserves all wonder [pantos thaumatos] is 
that respect in which he is like no human being, neither 
the ancients nor those of the present day.58 
 
Alcibiades observes that Brasidas may be compared to Achilles, and Pericles 
may be compared to Nestor or Antenor, but where can one find Socrates’ 
likeness?59 Socrates’ “strangeness” (atopian) is simply incomparable “both in 
himself and in his speeches.”60 Who else makes speeches that constantly refer 
to “pack-asses, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and tanners,” giving the illusion that 
the philosopher “is always saying the same things through the same things,” 
when in truth these speeches are unmatched in terms of being sensible, godly, 
and a guiding light for those who wish to be “beautiful and good”?61 No matter 
where he looks, Alcibiades simply cannot find a human analogue for his 
beloved Socrates; the latter is akin, if he is akin to anything at all, to the 
“silenuses and satyrs.”62 Ugly in his countenance yet beautiful from within, 
                                                 
55 “Aristophanes, Clouds, 362.” Translator’s footnote. 
56 Plato, Symposium, 220d-221c.   
57 Homer, Odyssey, 4.178-180. 
58 Plato, Symposium, 221c.  Gloss added. 
59 Ibid., 221c. 
60 Ibid., 221d.   
61 Ibid., 221e-222a. 
62 Ibid., 221d.  
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seemingly obsessed with lovely bodies yet truthfully more taken with virtuous 
souls, and offering speeches that are as profound in their meaning as they are 
simple in their terms, Socrates’ unique nature truly merits “all wonder.”  
Of course, Plato’s account of humanity’s wondrous nature is not 
limited to a presentation of the strange or uncanny elements that dwell within 
Socrates or any other human being.  Plato is not a circus barker with a 
philosophical bent who only offers up the more outlandish aspects of the 
human person so that we may gawk, stare, and sate our lust for that which is 
odd.  For instance, one of the most beautiful expressions of wonder in the 
dialogues occurs in the Phaedo, and its object is neither ‘typhonic’ nor silenic.  
Instead, it is the concern of a remarkable friend that provokes a deep sense of 
wonder in the dialogue’s namesake.   Let us turn, then, to the Phaedo.63 
 
Wondrous Songs: Phaedo 
 
PHAEDO: For my part, wondrous were the things I experienced 
when I was present.  — Plato, Phaedo 
 
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a d  t h e  Phaedo and not be inspired by Socrates’ 
dignified and resolute bearing as he prepares to drink the hemlock.  Jacques-
Louis David’s famous painting of the philosopher’s final moments, The Death of 
Socrates, perfectly captures the gadfly’s calm at the moment of truth; reaching 
for the cup of hemlock with one hand while pointing to the heavens with the 
other, we see Socrates admonishing his friends to dedicate their lives to the 
highest matters.  The painting also captures the grief felt by the other 
characters in the Phaedo, and a good number of its readers, despite Socrates’ 
best efforts to persuade them that death will not destroy what is truly 
important: his soul.  As we shall see, these efforts reflect the care of a true 
friend, and it is this care that calls for our greatest wonder.   
“For my part, wondrous [thaumasia] were the things I experienced 
when I was present.”64 With these words, Phaedo, for the benefit of his friend 
Echecrates, begins his narrative account of what transpired that fateful day in 
the prison cell before Socrates drank the hemlock.  A recollection and a 
declaration of wonder, then, set the dialogue in motion.  Indeed, there are quite 
a few “wondrous” things that come up during Socrates’ last day of 
philosophical discussion, including four arguments for and two arguments 
against the immortality of the soul.65 Although the arguments themselves are 
wondrous enough, they are not the greatest source of wonder in this work.  At 
                                                 
63 My reading of this particular section of the Phaedo is deeply indebted to the 
“Introduction” written by Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem in their translation of the Phaedo cited 
above. 
64 Plato, Phaedo, 58e.  Gloss added. 
65 In the introduction to their translation of the Phaedo, Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem 
designate the four arguments as “the argument from contraries, the argument from recollection, the 
argument from invisibility, and the argument from cause.” See Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem, 
“Introduction,” 4.    
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88c of the dialogue, immediately after Phaedo recounts two powerful 
arguments against the immortality of the soul raised by Simmias and Cebes, two 
members of the group gathered in Socrates’ cell, Echecrates interrupts his 
friend’s narrative with the following interjection: 
                                                                                                                                   
By the gods, Phaedo, I have real sympathy for all of you! 
For as I myself now listen to you, it occurs to me to say 
something like this to myself: “What argument will we 
trust from now on? The one that was so powerfully 
trustworthy—the argument that Socrates gave—has now 
fallen into discredit.” For this argument, that our soul is a 
sort of tuning has now, as ever, a wonderful [thaumastos] 
hold on me, and your speaking of it reminded me, as it 
were, that up till now all this seemed to be the case to me 
too.  And now what I really need is some other argument 
which will, from a new beginning as it were, persuade me 
that when somebody dies, the soul won’t die along with 
him.  So tell me, by Zeus, in what direction did Socrates 
pursue the argument? And which was it: Did he too, as 
you say the rest of you did, reveal in any way that he was 
distressed; or didn’t he, and did he instead come serenely 
to the aid of the argument? And was his aid sufficient, or 
did it fall short? Go through everything for us as precisely 
as you can.66 
 
I will forgo commenting on Cebes’ argument and focus instead on Simmias’, as 
it is the latter’s position that seems to trouble Echecrates the most.  The 
Pythagorean view that the soul “is a sort of tuning” has always had a 
“wonderful hold” on Echecrates, and Simmias has seemingly laid waste to it by 
means of introducing a counterargument based on the image of a tuned lyre.67 
Imagine that the soul is akin to the body in the same way that the tuning of a 
lyre is akin to the lyre.  If the tuning of the lyre ceases to be when the 
instrument itself is destroyed, is it not the case that the soul will share the same 
fate when the body dies? After considering Phaedo’s recounting of this 
argument, Echecrates now succumbs to the same doubt and dejection that 
befell Phaedo and the rest of Socrates’ companions during the original 
discussion.  Invoking the divine twice, Echecrates expresses “sympathy” for 
those who gathered that day in the prison cell and, more ominously, a waning 
faith in the worth of philosophical argumentation itself: “What argument will 
we trust from now on?” ‘Misology’, literally a “hatred of reason,” is the term 
that Plato coins for this mistrust of argumentation.68 The same specter of 
misology that threatened Phaedo and the others in the cell now threatens 
                                                 
66 Plato, Phaedo, 88c-e.  Gloss added. 
67 Ibid., 85e-86d.   
68 Ibid., 89d.  
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Echecrates, and he implores Phaedo to resume his account, wondering aloud if 
Socrates too had become “distressed” at this crucial moment in the discussion.  
What did the examined life’s peerless practitioner and advocate do when he 
found his friends’ trust in arguments beginning to crumble?69 
As Echecrates’ current distress shows, the threat of misology is ever-
present, and his interest in how Socrates confronted such an ominous foe is 
perfectly understandable.  According to Phaedo, Socrates’ response to the 
collective distress of those present in his cell was both admirable and 
wondrous: 
 
Although, Echecrates, I’d often wondered [thaumasas] at 
Socrates, I never admired [egasthen] him more than when I 
was present with him then.  That he should have 
something to say was perhaps not out of the ordinary.  
No, what I really wondered [ethaumasa] at him for was 
this: first, how pleasantly and kindly and admiringly 
[agamenos] he received the young men’s arguments, then 
how keenly he perceived how we’d suffered under their 
arguments, then how well he healed us and, as if we were 
men who’d fled and been laid low, rallied us and turned 
us about to follow him and consider the argument.70  
 
As it is “not out of the ordinary,” as Phaedo puts it, for Socrates to not find 
himself at a loss for words, so too is it not out of the ordinary for Phaedo to 
find himself, to use Jerome Miller’s exquisite phrase, “in the throe of wonder” 
in the presence of Socrates.71 Indeed, it is Phaedo who opens his narration by 
noting the “wondrous” events that he experienced during Socrates’ last day.  
With this in mind, let us take a closer look at what provokes Phaedo’s wonder 
at this key moment in the dialogue. 
The fact that Socrates has a ready response to the seemingly 
devastating arguments against the immortality of the soul is not the primary 
cause of Phaedo’s wonder.  Socrates has spent the better part of a lifetime 
engaged in dialectical exchange and examining arguments, so it is not 
                                                 
69 Plato, Apology, 38a: “If, on the other hand, I say that this is a very great good for a 
human being—to make speeches every day about virtue and other things of which you have 
heard me speak when examining myself and others, and that for a human being the unexamined 
life is not worth living, still less, when I say these things, will you be persuaded by me.  Yet, such 
is the case, as I affirm, men, however to persuade you is not easy.” Taken from Plato and 
Xenophon: Apologies, trans. by Mark Kremer (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2006). 
70 Plato, Phaedo, 88e-89a.  Gloss added. Both egasthen and agamenos stem from the word 
agamai, a word whose various meanings include to wonder, to be astonished, and to admire a 
person or thing.  See An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: Founded Upon the Seventh Edition of 
Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, s.v.  “.” With respect to Phaedo’s use of these 
terms, the meaning seems to be a combination of admiration and wonder or an admiring 
wonder.    
71 Jerome Miller, In the Throe of Wonder (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1992).  
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astonishing that he has something to say about Simmias and Cebes’ arguments 
as such.  Rather, Phaedo’s wonder is incited by a combination of Socrates’ 
openness to the arguments, the philosopher’s discernment of his friends’ 
suffering in light of what the arguments imply, and his skillful healing of their 
distress.  Unlike the others present, whose hopes for an argument establishing 
the immortality of the soul have been dashed upon the rocks, Socrates is 
neither daunted nor depressed by Simmias and Cebes’ respective challenges.  
Instead, the philosopher admires the quality of their arguments and, we can 
safely assume, the honesty and respect for true philosophical discussion that 
they reflect.  Even as his final hour quickly approaches, Socrates remains open 
to and even encourages a critical assessment of his arguments; the 
philosopher’s time may be growing short, but he himself does not become 
short with those who find fault with his views.  No less wondrous than 
Socrates’ gentle reception of these challenges is the philosopher’s recognition 
of just how severely his friends have been shaken by them.  Socrates’ friends 
are now at great risk of succumbing entirely to misology, and the philosopher 
simply refuses to leave them in such a vulnerable state, as “it’s not possible. . . 
for anybody to experience a greater evil than hating arguments.”72 While many 
find their empathy for the plight of others blunted when they are forced to deal 
with a minor inconvenience or trivial annoyance, Socrates’ concern for his 
friends’ well-being remains acute even in the face of his own imminent death.  
Finally, the wounds inflicted by misology, even in its incipient stage, run deep, 
perhaps far more deep than any that might afflict the body.  Given the severity 
of these wounds and the brief amount of time Socrates has to tend them, the 
philosopher’s eventual success as a healer is surely nothing if not wondrous. 
Given these considerations, one begins to understand and share 
Phaedo’s amazement at Socrates’ disposition and conduct.  Indeed, is there a 
more definitive example of ‘other-regarding’ behavior in the history of Western 
philosophy than what is found depicted in these famous passages from the 
Phaedo? On the day that he is scheduled to die, Socrates is first and foremost 
concerned with his friends’ welfare! Socrates will respond to Simmias and 
Cebes’ challenges, and by means of skillful dialectic and a beautiful myth, he 
will “sing away,” at least for the time being, the threat of misology and the fear 
of death that plague his companions.73 In the last hours of the philosopher’s 
life, it will not only be the virtuosity of Socrates’ songs, but the care that 
grounds the singing itself, which will evoke Phaedo’s greatest admiration and 
wonder.74  
 
                                                 
72 Plato, Phaedo, 89d. 
73 Ibid., 77e.  Here Socrates speaks of the importance of singing “incantations” to 
oneself in order to “sing away” one’s fears concerning death.  See also Brann, Kalkavage, and 
Salem, “Introduction,” 9. 
74 In an article entitled “Socratic Wonder and Philosophical Counseling,” I also 
provide an analysis of the relationship between Socrates and wonder in the Phaedrus and the 
Phaedo.  See David Bollert, “Socratic Wonder and Philosophical Counseling,” in Philosophical 
Practice, 5:1 (March 2010), 576-587.  
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Wonder at Thyself: Crito, Charmides, and Theaetetus  
 
THEODORUS: Know well, of all whom I’ve ever met—and I’ve 
consorted with very many—I’m aware of no one yet whose nature is 
as wonderfully good. — Plato, Theaetetus 
 
Upon close reading of the dialogues, one finds many instances of 
wonder occasioned by different types of human temperament, appearance, and 
conduct.  For example, the opening scene of the Crito reveals the wonder of 
the dialogue’s namesake at the calm and dignified demeanor of Socrates in the 
face of his impending execution.  Socrates awakes in his cell to find Crito, one 
of his oldest friends, sitting patiently and quietly in the corner, reluctant to 
adisturb the philosopher’s slumber.  Socrates is somewhat baffled as to why 
Crito did not wake him as soon as he entered the cell.  Crito, who has arranged 
for Socrates’ escape and hopes to persuade him that it would be wise to flee 
Athens, answers his old friend in the following way: 
 
Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all 
this sleeplessness and sorrow.  But I have been wondering 
[thaumazo] at your peaceful slumbers, and that was the 
reason why I did not awaken you, because I wanted you 
to be out of pain.  I have always thought you happy in the 
calmness of your temperament; but never did I see the 
like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this 
calamity.75 
 
Socrates is the one who is sentenced to die, yet it is Crito who is losing sleep 
over Athens’ decision to execute his old friend; this seemingly incongruous 
state of affairs is what throws Crito into a state of wonder. By means of some 
gentle admonishments and thoughtful discussion, Socrates is finally able to 
convince Crito that a truly incongruent state of affairs here would entail a 
mutual disregard for the verdict reached by their fellow citizens under the 
auspices of Athenian law.  Indeed, it would be his escaping from his cell and 
flouting the laws of Athens—laws that he has benefited from his entire life and 
implicitly accepted by remaining in the city of his own free will—that Socrates 
would deem to be truly worthy of his old friend’s wonder. 
As evidenced by the opening scene of the Charmides, a human being’s 
physical appearance can also evoke wonder in the dialogues.  As the dialogue 
opens, Socrates is telling an unnamed listener about his recent participation in a 
battle at Potidaea and the enthusiastic welcome he received from his friends 
when he returned unharmed to Athens.76 After answering their questions about 
the conflict, Socrates proceeds to ask some questions of his own: Have any of 
the city’s young men “become distinguished for wisdom or beauty or both” in 
                                                 
75 Plato, Crito, 43b.  Gloss added. Taken from Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. by 
Benjamin Jowett (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988).   
76 Plato, Charmides, 153a.    
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his absence?77 One of Socrates’ comrades, Critias, notes that in terms of 
beauty, the young Charmides, who happens to be Critias’ cousin, is now 
thought by many to be the “handsomest young man of the day.”78 Charmides 
soon arrives on the scene, and Socrates’ description of the excitement and 
wonder caused by the youth’s beauty is worth quoting in full: 
 
Now nothing is to be measured by me, comrade, for I am 
simply a white line when it comes to those who are 
beautiful, because all who have just reached maturity 
appear beautiful to me.  But especially then he appeared 
wondrous [thaumastos] to me in both stature and beauty, 
and indeed, at least in my opinion, all the others were in 
love with him, so excited and confused had they become 
as he came in.  Indeed, many other lovers were also 
following among those behind him.  Now this was not 
wondrous [thaumaston] on the part of us men; but turning 
my attention to the boys, I noticed that none of them, not 
even the littlest, looked anywhere else, but all were 
contemplating [etheonto] him as if he were a statue.79 
 
Socrates admits that all who have reached Charmides’ stage of physical 
development “appear beautiful” to him, but Charmides, in both “stature” and 
“beauty,” is simply “wondrous” and therefore stands out in high relief among 
Athens’ other young men.  So astonishing is this young man’s beauty that even 
the children are transfixed by his looks.  Socrates notes that all the boys within 
eyeshot of Charmides, without exception, fell to “contemplating” (etheonto) him 
as one would contemplate a beautiful “statue.” Plato’s word choice is 
significant here.  Etheonto stems from the word theaomai, a verb that frequently 
means to gaze at or behold with wonder.80 Of course, Socrates is far more 
interested in beautiful souls than he is with beautiful bodies, and he proceeds 
to engage Charmides in a philosophical conversation about the nature of 
moderation in order to see if the young man is as beautiful within as he is 
without.  Such a concomitance of internal and external beauty would surely be 
                                                 
77 Plato, Charmides, 153b-d. Taken from Plato, Charmides, trans. by Thomas G. West 
and Grace Starry West (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986). 
78 Ibid., 154a. 
79 Ibid., 154b-c.  Gloss added. 
80 Paul Walter Ludwig, Eros & Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 276, n. 31. According to Indra McEwen, 
theaomai is linked with both thaumazein, the act of wondering, and thauma, the object of wonder, in 
Homer’s epic poetry: “The verb thaumazein (to wonder at, marvel) and the noun thauma (a 
wonder, a marvel) are very closely related to theaomai, for in Homer it is almost invariably what 
is seen that is wondered at: it is the eyes that marvel.” Indra Kagis McEwen, Socrates’ Ancestor: An 
Essay on Architectural Beginnings (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 21.  Charles Segal notes 
that the word “theatre” itself stems from theaomai and links the verb to wonder as well: “Theatron, 
‘theatre,’ is a space for beholding, derived from the verb theaomai, to behold with wonder.” 
Charles Segal, Interpreting Greek Tragedy: Myth, Poetry, Text (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1986), 75.    
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marvelous—indeed, it would almost beggar belief—as Charmides’ radiant 
appearance, from Socrates down to the “littlest” boy, has already proven to be 
a source of considerable wonder. 
Finally, let us recall the wonder of the mathematician Theodrous, as 
depicted in the Theaetetus, at the intellectual gifts and disposition of the 
dialogue’s namesake.  At the beginning of the dialogue, Theodorus recalls a 
conversation he had with Socrates several years ago in which the 
mathematician described his most promising student at the time, the young 
Theaetetus, in the following way: 
 
Know well, of all whom I’ve ever met—and I’ve 
consorted with very many—I’m aware of no one yet 
whose nature is as wonderfully [thaumastos] good.  For to 
be as good a learner as he is, in a way that’s hard for 
anyone to match, and yet to be exceptionally gentle, and 
on top of this to be manly beyond anyone whatsoever, I 
would have expected that it doesn’t occur and I don’t see 
it occurring, for those who are as sharp as he is, quick 
witted, and with good memories are for the most part 
also quickly inclined to bursts of anger, and in darting 
about they’re swept along like unballasted ships, and they 
grow up more manic than more manly, whereas those in 
turn who are more grave face up to their lessons 
somewhat sluggishly and are full of forgetfulness.  But he 
goes so smoothly, so unfalteringly, and so effectively to 
his lessons and investigations, and all with so much 
gentleness, just as a stream of olive-oil flows without a 
sound, as for it be a cause of wonder [thaumasai] that 
someone his age behaves in this way.81 
 
Theodorus has “consorted with very many” students over the course of his 
teaching career, some of whom may very well have been bright and “gentle” to 
a certain degree, but he has never come across one like Theaetetus, who 
possesses both traits in remarkable abundance.  Others may learn in fits and 
starts, but Theaetetus takes to his “lessons” as a fish takes to water or a bird 
takes to the sky; it is almost as if such “investigations” comprise his natural 
environment, the medium in which he is most able to flourish and thrive.  The 
students who share Theaetetus’ quick wit and reliable memory are likened by 
Theodorus to “unballasted ships,” as they succumb easily to anger and 
impulsively flit about from place to place; an unpromising adulthood awaits 
these intelligent but impetuous youth, an adulthood that is “more manic than 
                                                 
81 Plato, Theaetetus, 144a-b.  Gloss added. In his essay “. . . A Wonder That One Could 
Never Aspire To Surpass,” John Sallis analyzes the opening of the Theaetetus, including the 
wonder that surrounds Theaetetus, in great detail.  My contention that the thought, bearing, 
passions, and actions of human beings are frequent and important objects of wonder in Plato’s 
dialogues is both inspired by and indebted to Sallis’ excellent essay.    
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more manly,” and Theodorus clearly believes that the fate of such unstable 
individuals is not to be envied.  Unfortunately, the “grave” students who lack 
the mania of their more impulsive peers lack their alacrity and ability to retain 
what they have learned as well.  Sailing between the Scylla of “unballasted” 
acumen and the Charybdis of even-keeled dullness, Theaetetus progresses in 
his studies with a bearing that is “gentle” yet “manly” and a mind that reliably 
retains what it so quickly discerns.  Such a nature in one so young, according to 
Theodorus, is indeed a “cause for wonder.”82 As we saw in the epigraph at the 
beginning of this paper, Theaetetus admits to Socrates that he “wonders 
exceedingly” about matters both mathematical and ontological, an admission 
which gives rise to Socrates’ famous declaration that wonder is the arche of 
philosophy.  Like Socrates, the exceptional youth invokes in others the very 
pathos that befalls him with considerable frequency and power. Like Athens’ 
gadfly, Theaetetus is both a wonderer and a wonder of the highest order. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Plato did not shrink from recognizing the contraditions and 
complexities in Socrates’ nature.  For Plato, his teacher was an 
ineffable, irreducible source of wonder. — James Lesher, “Later 
Views of the Socrates of Plato’s Symposium” 
 
Plato identifies wonder as the origin and sustaining principle of 
philosophy, and it would be difficult to overstate wonder’s importance in the 
very works in which the philosopher brings the love of wisdom to dramatic 
life.  The passages examined in this paper strongly suggest that Plato not only 
holds the human person to be the type of being who wonders at things such as 
mathematical puzzles, transcendent Forms, or superhuman bodies, but that he 
considers the human person to be a source or object of wonder as well.  In 
short, we are both subject to and causes of thaumazein, the pathos from which 
philosophy is born and continually nourished. Further, the sheer range of 
human attributes, affinities, and actions that evoke wonder in the dialogues is 
itself wondrous.  As we have seen, Socrates’ calm and dignified bearing in the 
face of his impending execution; his steadfast refusal to let his friends fall prey 
to misology; his silent and unwavering twenty-four hour bout of thaumazein at 
Potidaea; and his possible affinity with Typhon, sileni, and the satyr Marsyas are 
all, to borrow the gadfly’s expression, “worthy of our wonder.” No less worthy 
in this regard are the temperament and intellect of the young Theaetetus and 
the physical beauty of Charmides.  Finally, prudence dictates a cautionary word 
                                                 
82 In her book Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, Andrea Tschemplik 
offers an incisive account of Platonic wonder in general and why Theaetetus evokes wonder in 
others in particular.  See Andrea Tschemplik, Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus 
(Lanham, MD-Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008).  While the scope of her excellent book is not 
limited to an investigation of Platonic wonder alone, Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s Strange Wonder: The 
Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe includes an insightful and nuanced treatment of the 
subject.    
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with respect to Platonic wonder.  While it is clear that Plato finds the human 
person to be wondrous in many respects, this does not mean that he 
ontologically or epistemically privileges the realm of humanity, with its flitting 
particulars and shadowy opinions, over and above the realm of that which is 
unchanging, universal, and pellucidly true; to claim this would be to ignore the 
general sway of such dialogues as the Republic and Phaedo.  Instead, I would like 
to suggest that Plato is simply reminding us that nonhuman entities do not 
exhaust what is truly “worthy of our wonder.” Indeed, perhaps the philosopher 
simply wishes to add to the Delphic injunction “Know thyself” an exhortative 
corollary: “Wonder at thyself.” 
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